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The program for the simulation of electoral systems ALEX4.1: 
what it does and how to use it 
 
Marie-Edith Bissey and Guido Ortona 
 
 
1. Introduction.  
 
      This paper illustrates ALEX4.1, the 2007 version of the program of simulation of electoral 
systems developed at ALEX, the Laboratory for Experimental and Simulative Economics of the 
Università del Piemonte Orientale at Alessandria, Italy. The main features of the program have been 
described with reference to a previous version in Bissey, Carini and Ortona, 2004; the paper may be 
freely downloaded from the site of the journal where it has been published, or in its working paper 
version from the site http://polis.unipmn.it/. The organization of this paper is, consequently, rather 
unusual. The next section presents only the very basic traits of the simulation program, as most 
details and theoretical considerations may be read in the quoted (and easy-to-find) reference. 
Sections 3 and 4 are the most important: they illustrate the novelties of ALEX4.1 with respect to 
previous versions. Section 5 is very short, as it  contains only the instructions for downloading the 
program, and some caveats regarding its use. The core of the paper is a large appendix that contains 
the readme file of the package ALEX4.1. Actually, this paper should be considered a handbook for 
the use of ALEX4.1.  
 
2. The program of simulation of electoral systems ALEX4.1: basic traits.  
 
   The program refers to an one-Chamber Parliament, from now on "the Parliament".  
The inputs, required to the user, are: 
a) The size of the Parliament; 
b) The number of voters; 
c) The number of parties (which coincides with the number of candidates in every constituency for 
non proportional systems); 
d) The nation-wide share of votes of each party; 
e) The probability that the second preferred party is next to the first preferred, and the probability 
that it is a second next party. These probabilities are employed to produce the full ordering of 
preferences for parties of every voter, through a random-number device; 
f) The (optional) concentration of some parties in some constituencies; 
g) The (optional) location of each party on the left-right axis. If this input is not provided, the 
program assumes equidistance among parties. Note that the (at least ordinal) left-to-right location is 
necessary for the generation of the full ordering of preferences. This means that the program 
assumes (implicitly) a one-dimension spatiality of the policy. An interesting (but probably quite 
demanding) improvement could be a two-dimension location of the parties.  
  Note that these inputs may be imported from a database (or stored and modified), see the appendix 
for details. 
  The outputs  are: 
a) The distribution of the seats among parties; 
b) Some indexes of representativeness  and governability, described in next section. For the indexes 
of governability to be computed, the user must first decide the governing majority. 
   The processing capabilities of the program have not been fully assessed yet, also because they 
depend mostly on the computer employed. However, a normal PC may safely manage a Parliament 
with 100 seats, 200 voters for each constituency and 10 parties.  The electoral system more 
demanding in terms of memory employed is the Single Transferable Vote, as it may be expected; its   2
exclusion increases considerably the speed of the computing. Note that the program works with 
"real", albeit virtual, individual voters, and not with aggregate shares. 
 
The electoral systems so far included in the program are: 
a) One-district proportionality; 
b) Multi district proportionality; 
c) Threshold proportionality; 
d) Plurality; 
e) Run-off Majority; 
f) Mixed-member system; 
g) Mixed-member system with the exclusion of the votes employed in the plurality from the 
proportional assignment; 
h) Borda Count; 
i) Condorcet; 
l) Single transferable vote; 
m) VAP system, a suggested new system currently under scrutiny. Broadly speaking, it assigns 
more  votes  (but not more seats) in the Parliament to the majority coalition, to increase the 
governability. In experimental settings it usually  performs very well. A description may be found 
in the appendix and in Bissey, Carini and Ortona, 2004; a broader discussion is in Ortona, 2000. 
Proportional systems may employ D'Hondt, Sainte-Lague, Hare and Imperiali quotas, and STV may 
employ Droop, NB and Hare quotas. The addition of new systems is a relatively easy task, see the 
appendix. The approval voting has not (yet) been included, because former experiments showed 
that it is usually dominated  by Borda and Condorcet
1. All non-proportional systems allow for 
strategic voting of the voters; this is a new feature, and we will illustrate how it works in  section 4. 
Finally, the governability index may be corrected to take into account the weight of factions inside 
the parties. This also is a feature introduced in the last version, and we will discuss it in section 4 
too. 
 
3. The program of simulation of electoral systems ALEX4.1: new indexes.  
 
The previous version, ALEX3, contained only an index of representativeness and an index of 
governability. The index of  representativeness, call it r1, is defined as follows: 
 
 
           n                      n 
r1,j = 1-(Σ|Sj,i – Spp,i|) / (Σ|Su,i - Spp,i |) 
          i=1                   i=1 
 
where j refers to the electoral system, n is the number of parties, Sj,i is the number of seats obtained 
by party i under system j,  Spp,i is the number of seats obtained by party i under one-district perfect 
proportionality rule (PPR), and Su,i is the number of seats obtained by party i if all the seats go to 
the largest party
2. 
    The loss of representativeness incurred by party i is the (absolute) difference between the seats it 
would get under PPR and those actually obtained. Summing this loss across all the parties we obtain 
the total loss of R (first sum).  In order to normalize (0 to 1) this value, we divide it by the total 
possible loss of R. This maximum is obtained when the relative majority party takes all the seats 
(second sum). This way we got a loss of representativeness index, normalized in the range 0-1. 
                                                 
1 We consider a system to be dominated by another one when the indexes of both representativeness and governability 
are lower in the first case. 
2 The value of Su,i is the total number of seats for the largest party, and 0 for all the others. If several parties are the 
largest ones ex aequo, we take the one which is the largest under most systems in the case considered.    3
Subtracting it from 1 we transform it into a representativeness   index. For instance, if in the 
Parliament there are 100 seats and three parties, A,B,C, with 20, 30 and 50 seats respectively under 
PPR and 10, 20 and 70 under system X, the value of the second sum is 80, that of the first is 40, and 
the value of r1 is 0.5. 
  As for the index of governability, g1, many scholars assume that governability is inversely related 
to the number of decision makers, supposed to be that of parties in the governing coalition. There is 
a lot of debate on this topic. Some authors (including one of the authors of this paper) do not agree: 
see for instance Lijphart, 1994, or Farrell, 2001. However, this is the only general argument to 
prefer non-proportional systems; hence we accept it, to make the program useful for those who 
share this opinion, avoiding a broader discussion that would clearly go beyond the purpose of this 
paper. More precisely, we assume that governability  depends mostly on the number of crucial 
parties of the governing coalition, i.e. of parties that  destroy the majority if they withdraw, m; and 
secondarily on the share of seats of the majority, f.  Hence, we add lexicographically the f-
component, gf, to the m-component, gm. The range of gf is the difference between successive values 
of gm:  the term in m defines a lower and an upper boundary, and the term in f specifies the value of 
the index between them. 
   The limits defined by gm are simply 1/m (upper boundary) and 1/(m+1) (lower boundary). For 
instance, if the Government is supported by just one party, g1 is comprised between 0.5 and 1; if it 
supported by two (or by three and more, but with only two large enough to destroy the majority if 
they withdraw) g1 is comprised between 0.333 and 0.5, and so on.  Note that the addition of new 
parties produces smaller and smaller decreases in g, as it should be. The figure to be added to the 
lower boundary, gf,  depends on the lead of the majority coalition, according to the following 
proportion: 
 




gf = [1/m - 1/(m+1)] (f-t/2)/(t/2) 
 
where t is the total number of seats in the Parliament. 
 
For instance, if  there are 100 seats, and the governing majority is made up of one party with 59 
MPs, the value of gf is 0.09 (9/50*1/2). This value must be added to 0.5, to give a value of g1  equal 
to 0.59. In sum, the formula for g1 is: 
 
g1 =  gm +gf = 1/(m+1) + [1/m - 1/(m+1)] (f-t/2)/(t/2) 
 
where m = number of crucial  parties supporting the Government, f = number of seats of the 
majority, t= total number of seats. The  value of g reaches its maximum, 1, when  a party as  all the 
seats (i.e. m=1), and  decreases with the increase of m, thus justifying the claim that the range of g1 
is the interval (0,1].
3 
   The version 4.1 keeps these two indexes, but adds a new index of representativeness and two of 
governability. The additional index of representativeness, r2, is introduced for sake of simplicity, 
and is defined as 
 
r2 = 1-X/T 
 
                                                 
3 The discussion of the indexes defined above is mostly quoted from Bissey, Carini and Ortona, 2004.    4
where X is the overall number of seats obtained in excess with respect to one-district PPR, i.e. with 




   The first additional index of governability, g2, is also added for sake of simplicity
6, as it is easily 
understandable
7. It is given simply by the ratio S/N, where S is the number of seats and N the 
number of parties of the governing coalition. Note that r1 is highly correlated with r2, and g1 with g2, 
as results from the backstage inquiries for Ortona, 2006, as may be expected. 
    The third index of governability, g3, adds something more relevant, i.e. the consideration of 





where j refers to the electoral system, S and N have the same meaning as above, P is the number of 
parties of  the minimal majority in the one-district proportional system that includes the same 
parties that form the majority in system j, and a, ranging 0 to 1, is an elasticity parameter to be 
established by the user. The meaning of g3 is explained in next section. 
 
4. The program of simulation of electoral systems ALEX4.1: factions and strategic voting.  
 
    The main novelties of the version 4.1 are the consideration of factions and the possibility of 
strategic voting. The factions may be taken into account through the computing of g3. As we noted 
above, there are many doubts on the relation between number of governing parties and 
governability. To our opinion, the weakness of the relationship is mostly due to the fact that the 
number of parties often does not coincide with that of decisors. Parties may express a solid, unified 
will: this was for instance the case in the heroic times when the British Labour Party was the voice 
of strong and clearly oriented workers' Unions. However, they may also be feeble coalitions of 
parties very poorly inclined to give up their autonomy, forced to unite  (in homage to the law of 
Duverger) in a first-past-the-post election. This, for instance, was the case of Italy in the elections 
from 1994 to 2001. In other terms, there is a continuous of possibilities, ranging from strong, 
monolithic parties to no difference with respect to the set of parties running in a perfectly 
proportional election. 
  This span is captured by the exponent a in g3, ranging 0 to 1. On one extreme, If a=0, g3 collapses 
to S/N, i.e. to g2; on the other, if a=1, g3 collapses again on g2, but this time it is evaluated as S/P: 
the number of parties to be taken into consideration is not that of the system under exam, but that of 
perfectly proportional representation.    
  Obviously, a must be assessed exogenously. We suggest that to try to evaluate it with reference to 
real cases is a very interesting and challenging research topic, but it is not within the scope of this 
paper. 
  Finally,  ALEX4.1  introduces the consideration of  strategic voting. In previous versions, in 
plurality and majority systems voters voted sincerely. This is obviously an unrealistic feature: in  
real world, most voters whose preferred party has no chance of winning either abstain or cast their 
votes for the second (third, etc.) preferred party. Actually, no-chance parties often do not even take 
part in the polls.  
  For the results of the simulation in plurality and majority,  to abstain or to vote for a no-chance 
party provide the same result. Hence what must be introduced is the possibility for the voter either 
                                                 
4 The number of seats in excess is equal to that of seats in defect; to provide the number of seats misallocated they must 
by counted only once. 
5 The main advantage of r2 over r1 is that it may be easily understood by respondents in surveys (for an experiment, see 
Ortona, 2006).  
6 See again Ortona, 2006. 
7 It also has been employed in the experiment described in Ortona, 2006.   5
to vote for a would-be winner or to vote for the preferred party. This is done through a probability, 
p, that must be entered by the user. If the probability is 0, the voter will remain faithful to its 
preferred party; if it is 1, it will vote for sure for the largest party of the coalition that party belongs 
to, also to be defined by the user. If 0<p<1, the value of p is used to produce the choices of every 
voter, through a random-number device.  
  We assume (a) that the voter may only choose between its preferred party and the largest party of 
the coalition, and (b) that p is inversely related to the distance of the largest party from the preferred 




where 0 ≤ D ≤ 100 is the distance between the preferred party and the largest party of the coalition
8, 
k is a parameter entered by the user, and p is obviously truncated if necessary. This method for 
computing p may look cumbersome, but it incorporates the realistic assumption that the probability 
of voting for the largest party is not the same for all the voters of the coalition: voters preferring 
more far-away parties are less likely to switch. In any case, it is easy to compute out that 
 
k = 100(1-p)/D 
 
to deduce the value of  k from a desired value of p. 
 
 
5. How to download ALEX4.1.  
 
ALEX4.1 may be used for free. It is released under the GNU/GPL license. To obtain it, simply 
write to the Laboratory of Simulative and Experimental Economics of the Università del Piemonte 
Orientale at the address labalex@sp.unipmn.it. You will be requested to fulfil some requirements, 
namely: 
a) Not to employ ALEX4.1 for profit; 
b) Not to pass it to other users without the permission of the authors; 
c) To send to the Laboratory of Simulative and Experimental Economics of the Università del 
Piemonte Orientale a copy of the report, paper, etc. where you employ the program, and, if the case, 
the modified version of the program. 
   Finally, you will employ the program at your own risk - authors are not to be kept responsible for  
possible mistakes. The program has been tested very accurately, but the possibility of (hopefully 
minor) mistakes cannot be completely ruled out. If you find one, please let us know. 
                                                 
8 The whole left-right axis has a length of 100.     6
 
Appendix - User guide for ALEX4.1   
 
This appendix contains the file readme that accompanies the ALEX4.1 package. 
 
 Userguide for ALEX4 (simulation of electoral
systems)
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21 INTRODUCTION
The program is designed to compare electoral systems, on the basis of the voters’
preferences for the parties and the candidates (simulated, or from surveys). The
usercanentertheparametersintotheprogram(distributionofﬁrstpreferences, size
of the districts, etc.), or load them from a ﬁle. The program computes the resulting
parliament, representativeness indexes and governability indexes according to the
chosenelectoralsystem. Theprogramcanimplementuninominalandplurinominal
systems.
The program has been developed using Java version 1.4, and tested on Microsoft
Windows systems (2000 and XP). It is freeware, released under the GNU/GPL
license.
2 INSTALLATION OF THE PROGRAM
The program is contained in the ALEX4 directory. Unzip it (if necessary) and copy
this directory on the computer. (If the directory is copied from a CD, the ﬁles it
contains may be ‘read-only’, which may prevent the program to function correctly.
To remove this, select the directory, click on it with the right button of the mouse,
select Properties and de-select read-only, applying the command on all
ﬁles and subdirectories.)
The program is written in Java, so at least Java Runtime needs to be installed on
the computer for it to work. The oldest version of Java required for the program to
run correctly is version 1.4.0. Java Runtime can be downloaded from the following
URL: http://java.sun.com
In order to be able to launch the program from any directory, it is necessary to
include the executable javac in the path. In some cases, you can choose it during
the installation of Java. Otherwise you can follow the following steps (Windows
2000 and XP):
• double-click the System icon in the Control Panel
• click on Advanced, and then ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
• select the PATH variable and click on Modify
• add the following to the existing string
;PATH_TO_JAVA/bin
where PATH_TO_JAVA is the path to reach javac on the computer. For
instance:
c:\Programm Files\JRE\java\bin
33 USING THE PROGRAM
3.1 Starting the program
There are two ways to start the program:
• Double click on alex4.bat in the ALEX4 directory
• FromaMS/DOSwindow, usethecdcommandtogototheALEX4directory
and type: java ALEX4 at the prompt (Remember: Java is case sensitive!).
This starts the program in the default way, which uses at most 64Mb of the com-
puter’s memory. For some simulations with many voters, parties and/or candidates,
you may need more memory to run the program. In this case you can use the ex-
ecutables alex4_128.bat and alex4_256.bat which will use 128Mb and
256Mb of memory respectively.
Alternatively, you can type at the MSDos prompt: java -Xmx128m ALEX4 to
start Java with 128Mb of memory.
3.2 The desktop
When started, ALEX4 opens a window with several menus.
3.2.1 The File menu
This is the main menu of the program, from which the user can ask for new pref-
erences to be simulated, or load voter’s preferences, (for instance saved from a
previous simulation, or computed from external sources, see page 25 for a descrip-
tion of how to create a preference ﬁles).
From this menu, the user can also save the parliaments, when they have been cre-
ated.
3.2.2 The Edit menu
ALEX4 was developed with multilingual support. It is possible to change the lan-
guage used by the program from the Edit menu. The user can also set the current
language as the default. At the moment, the program can function in Italian, En-
glish and French. See page 25 for instructions on how to add a new language to the
program.
3.2.3 The Simulations menu
When the program is ﬁrst launched, this menu repeats the File menu, allowing to
create or to load a simulation of voters’ preferences. It is possible to open or create
severalssimulationsatthesametime, inordertoconfronttheresultingparliaments.
43.3 Creating a parliament from simulated preferences
NOTE: the program is set up to use the characteristics of its current language.
Therefore, if for instance the program’s language is French or Italian, the user will
have to use a comma for decimal numbers, whereas if the program’s language is
English, a dot will be required. This is independent from the actual language of the
computer’s operating system.
• From the File or the Simulations menu, choose Simulate new preferences
• The following parameters can be set in the ﬁrst window:
– number of voters in each uninominal district
– number of uninominal districts
– number of seats per plurinominal districts (that is the size of plurinom-
inal districts)
– number of parties
– probability to choose a ﬁrst adjacent party (see section 4.1)
– probability to choose a second adjacent party (see section 4.1)
– probability to choose the preferred candidate (see section 4.1)
To simulate plurinominal systems, the number of seats per plurinominal dis-
tricts must be greater than one. Remember to press RETURN to save each
new parameter value in the program. Clicking OK, the user sees a conﬁr-
mation window.
• The next window allows to set up the characteristics of the parties: their
name, their share of votes in the population, their position on a left/right axis
and whether the party is “major”, i.e. it is concentrated in some districts and
withwhatweight(seesection4.3). ClickingOK,theuserseesaconﬁrmation
window.
• The program starts creating for each voter his preference ordering for the
parties. Then it creates the uninominal districts (by grouping voters), and the
plurinominal districts (by grouping uninominal districts) if requested.
• Once the districts and the preferences are created, the user is asked to give
a name to the simulation, so that he can identify it in the Simulations menu.
Then the program opens a window with the list of the available electoral sys-
tems. To see the parliament resulting from a system, the user must click on
the button next to its name. If the parameter “number of seats for plurinomi-
nal districts” is greater than 1, the plurinominal systems are displayed in the
right hand column. If this parameter is equal to 1, only the left hand side
column is displayed (uninominal systems).
A window opens with the characteristics of the parliament: number of seats,
5Figure 1: Setting up the number of voters, parties, districts and the probabilities
Figure 2: Conferming inserted values
Figure 3: Setting up the characteristics of the parties
6Figure 4: Conferming the parameter values inserted for the parties
Figure 5: Starting creating the districts
Figure 6: List of available parliaments
7graphical representation, representativeness indexes, and the possibility to
create a government and compute the governability indexes. An example of
a results window is shown in ﬁgure 7.
Some systems need some extra parameters. A dialog window appears when
the user clicks on the name of the system to create the parliament. To close
the window, click on the X (upper right). From this window, and from the
File menu, it is possible to save the characteristics of the parliament.
There is no limit on the number of parliament windows that can be opened
in the program, therefore it is possbile to open a window for each available
parliament.
4 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROGRAM
4.1 Voters’preferencesfortheparties-whenthepositionontheleft/right
axis has not been speciﬁed
The program uses the following procedure to assign votes to parties: the ﬁrst n1
voters (corresponding to the share of Party 1 in the population) have Party 1 in the
ﬁrst place of their preference order, the next n2 voters (corresponding to the share
of Party 2 in the population) have Party 2 in the ﬁrst place of their preference order,
etc.
Thepartiesareassumedtobeorderedonaleft/rightscale, withParty1representing
the far left, and party n representing the far right. The parties are saved in an array
in increasing order of their index, independently of the name given by the user.
Oncetheﬁrstpreferenceofthevoterisknown, hiscompletepreferenceorderforall
parties is created. To do this, the program uses the probabilities deﬁned in the ﬁrst
window: the probability to choose an adjacent party (or p1), and the probability to
choose a second adjacent party (or p2). If these probabilities do not sum to 1, the
remainder is the probability to choose another party at random.
To sum up, to choose the second party in the voter’s preference order, the program
follows these steps:
1. the ﬁrst preferred party (or the one preferred at the moment) is deleted from
the list of available parties and is saved in the ﬁrst position in the voter’s
preference array.
2. to choose the second preferred party, the program chooses randomly with
probability p1 a party next to the one currently preferred, with probability
p2 a party second next to the one currently preferred, with probability p3 =
1 − p1 − p2 another party at random.
Practically, the choice of a party is done through giving each party a range of
numbers(from 1 to100). For instance, if thepreferrend partyis inthe middle
ofthearrayofparties, theﬁrstpartyontheleftofitisgiventhenumbersfrom
S1 = 50 − (p1/2) ∗ 100 to 50. The ﬁrst party on the right of it is given the
8Figure 7: Example of results: the One-District Proportional system
9numbers from 51 to D1 = 50 + (p1/2) ∗ 100. The second party on the left
of the preferred party is given the numbers from S2 = S1 − (p2/2) ∗ 100 to
S1. The second party on the right of the preferred party is given the numbers
from D1 to D2 = D1 + (p2/2) ∗ 100. The remaining numbers are given
to the other available parties. Then a number between 1 and 100 is chosen
randomly. The party chosen to be second in the voter’s preference order is
the one corresponding to this random number.
This party become the party currently preferred.
For the rest of the preference order, the program uses the same method, using the
party currently preferred as a starting point.
The method to choose the parties and attribute the numbers is adapted when the
party currently preferred is at the ends of the array of parties.
4.2 Voters’preferencesfortheparties-whenthepositionontheleft/right
axis has been speciﬁed
If the user has speciﬁed the position of the parties on the left/right axis, this infor-
mation is used to create the voters’ preferences for the parties. The procedure is as
follows:
1. The ﬁrst n1 voters (corresponding to the share of Party 1 in the population)
have Party 1 in the ﬁrst place of their preference order, the next n2 voters
(corresponding to the share of Party 2 in the population) have Party 2 in the
ﬁrst place of their preference order, etc.
2. For each voter, the parties, excepting the voter’s ﬁrst preference, are ordered
according to their distance on the left/right axis with respect to the ﬁrst party.
The voter’s ﬁrst preference becomes the “reference party”.
3. With probability p1 the next party in the voter’s preference ordering is the
closest to the reference party. With probability p2 the next party is the second
closest to the reference party. With probability p3 = 1 − p1 − p2 the next
party is one other party at random. If more than one party are at an equal
distance to the reference party, we choose one of them at random.
4. The party just chosen becomes the reference party and the procedure iterates
until the voter’s preference ordering is complete.
4.3 Voters’ preferences for the candidates
The procedure described in this section is employed for the simulation of the Single
Transferable Vote system (see 4.6.14).
1. we assume that each party presents a number of candidates equal to “Num-
ber of seats per plurinominal district”; therefore each party has a list of (at
10least 2) candidates. The candidates are inserted in the voters’ preferences
according to their position in the list: the candidate in ﬁrst position is chosen
before the candidate in second position, etc. When creating the voters’ pref-
erences for the candidates, the program takes into account their preferences
for the parties, computed as described above.
2. the necessary parameters, computed using the probabilities deﬁned in the
ﬁrst window of a simulation are as follows:
• Pp: probability of choosing a candidate from the preferred party (de-
ﬁned by the user at the beginning of a simulation: “Probability of
choosing the preferred candidate”)
• (1−Pp): probability of choosing a candidate from a party which is not
the preferred one
• P1: probability of choosing the party next to the preferred one (deﬁned
by the user at the beginning of a simulation: “probability to choose the
ﬁrst adjacent party”)
• P2: probabilityofchoosingthepartyinthirdplaceofthevoter’sprefer-
ence order (deﬁned by the user at the beginning of a simulation: “prob-
ability to choose the second adjacent party”)
• P3: probability of choosing one of the other parties in the voter’s pref-
erence order (1 − P1 − P2)
• (1−Pp).P1: probability to choose a candidate from the party in second
position in the voter’s preference order
• (1 − Pp).P2: probability to choose a candidate from the party in third
position in the voter’s preference order
• (1 − Pp).P3: probability to choose a candidate from another party in
the voter’s preference order
3. the parties are given number from 1 to 100 according to the following rules:
• the preferred party is given numbers from 1 to n1 = 100.Pp
• the second preferred party is given numbers from (n1 + 1) to n2 =
n1 + 100.[(1 − Pp).P1]
• the third preferred party is given numbers from (n2 + 1) to n3 = n2 +
100.[(1 − Pp).P2]
• the other parties are given numbers from (n3 + 1) to 100
4. the voter’s preferences for candidates are created extracting random numbers
from 1 to N = 100 and choosing the candidates from the party correspond-
ing to the chosen number, as explained below. To make the search faster,
the extracted number is removed from the range. When all candidates from
the party have been chosen, the numbers attributed to this party are removed
11from the range.
For this system to work, we need to be sure that each range contains enough
numbers to represent all candidates for the party. If the range is too small,
all the ranges are recomputed so that the range becomes big enough, and the
proportions of all ranges remain intact. At this point, the upper limit N of
the range may become greater than 100.
5. the voter’s ﬁrst preference is the ﬁrst candidate of the preferred party. This
candidate is deleted from the list of candidates for the party. The second
candidate in the party’s list becomes ‘ﬁrst’.
6. a number between 1 and N is chosen at random: the chosen candidate is
the one at the ﬁrst position of the party associated with this number. The
candidate is deleted from the list of available candidates for the party.
If the number extracted corresponds to the “other parties”, the party to con-
sider is randomly chosen among these “other parties”.
7. the process is repeated until the voter’s preference orders for the candidates
is completed.
4.4 Creating uninominal districts
NOTE: in what follows, ‘district’ stands for ‘uninominal district’.
The districts are created after the voters’ preferences have been computed. Each
district contains E voters, with E being equal to the value of the parameter “Num-
ber of voters per uninominal district” deﬁned by the user at the beginning of a
simulation (therefore, all the districts have the same size). In the program, it is
possible to set up the concentration of some parties in some districts (for instance,
think of districts in which a large majority of the voters vote for a given party,
whereas few voters vote for this party in other districts). This feature is deﬁned in
the third window of a simulation, when the user sets up the characteristics of the
parties. A party that is concentrated in one or more districts is called major party.
When a party is said to be major, the user must declare the number of districts in
which it is concentrated, and the weight of the concentration T > 1, which allows
the program to compute how many voters with this party as ﬁrst preference are
assigned to the district. In other words, let us deﬁne:
• K the number of districts in which the party is concentrated
• F the total number of voters with this party as ﬁrst preference
• N the size of the parliament (number of uninominal districts)
then each district in which the party is concentrated will contain T ∗ F/N voters
with this party as ﬁrst preference. T must be greater than 1 to make sure that the
voters are concentrated in some districts (thereafter called major districts).
12The creation of the uninominal districts is performed according to the following
steps:
1. Separate the major parties from the ‘normal’ parties, creating 2 lists. First,
the districts containing major parties are created. The districts containing
normal parties are created in a second stage.
2. For each major party:
(a) separate all voters with this party as ﬁrst preference from the other
voters, creating a new list, and deleting them from the list of voters
(b) ﬁnd out (from the characteristics of the party) the number of districts
in which the party is concentrated
(c) ﬁnd out (from the characterisitics of the party) the concentration coef-
ﬁcient (variable coefficient)
(d) ﬁnd out the share of votes of the party in the population
(e) ﬁnd out how many voters have this party as ﬁrst preference (variable
total, size of the list created above)
(f) ﬁnd out how many voters are inserted in the ‘major’ districts:
numberOfVotersToInsert=
coefficient*total/numberOfUninominalDistricts
(g) create the major districts for the party, inserting the number of voters
computed above
(h) if after this procedure some voters with the party as ﬁrst preference
have not been inserted in a district, they are put back into the main list
of voters.
When all major districts have been created, if some of them are not full (the
number of voters inserted in the major district is smaller than the size of the
district), they are completed with voters chosen randomly in the main list of
voters.
3. For each normal district: the required number of voters is chosen at random
from the main list of voters.
4.5 Creating plurinominal districts
NOTE: in what follows, ‘district’ stands for ‘uninominal district’.
The plurinominal districts are created grouping uninominal districts according to
the following rules:
131. the number of plurinominal districts that must be created is obtained dividing
the number of uninominal districts (which is equal to the size of the parlia-
ment) by the number of seats per plurinominal district.
NOTE: to differentiate between uninominal and plurinominal districts, the
‘name’ of the plurinominal districts are written with roman numbers in the
output from the program.
2. create a list of plurinominal districts with their names
3. separate the uninominal districts in 2 lists: major and normal
4. starting with the major districts (which contain concentrated parties)
(a) for each major party, the uninominal districts where this party is con-
centratedareextractedfromthelistofmajoruninominaldistricts. Then
a plurinominal district is taken at random in the list and the uninominal
districts where the party is concentrated are included in it, until either
the plurinominal district is complete or all the districts where the party
is concentrated have been inserted in a plurinominal district.
(b) if the plurinominal districts are not full with the major districts, they
are completed with non major uninominal districts, taken randomly.
5. if there are no major uninominal districts, or all the major districts have been
used, the remaining plurinominal districts are created taking at random the
requested number (“number of seats per plurinominal district”) of uninomi-
nal districts.
4.6 The parliaments
NOTE 1: If there are ex-aequo winners in a district (parties or candidates with the
same number of votes), the effective winner will be the party or candidate who has
the highest share in the whole population. In the case where the possible winners
also have the same share of votes in the population, the effective winner is chosen
at random among them.
NOTE 2: in what follows, ‘district’ stands for ‘uninominal district’.
4.6.1 One-district Proportionality
All districts are aggregated: the seats in the parliament have the same proportions
as the shares of votes in the population. In other words, the parliament represents
exactly (but for rounding) the shares inserted when setting up the simulation.
4.6.2 Threshold Proportionality
When the user clicks the button next to this system, a dialog window appears,
asking him to set-up the threshold level. All the parties who have a share of votes
14(strictly) smaller then this threshold level will be excluded from the parliament.
The seats are divided among the remaining parties proportionaly with their share
of votes in the population.
4.6.3 First Past The Post (Plurality)
The winner in each district is the party with the most votes in the district.
4.6.4 First Past The Post (Plurality) - with strategic vote
In this case, the voter has a positive probability of voting for the main party of a
coalition, instead of his preferred party. This probability is equal to:
p = (1 − kD/100)
where 0 ≤ D ≤ 100 is the distance between the main party of a coalition and the
voter’s preferred party.
When this system is chosen, the user is asked to give a value for k. The user is
then asked to deﬁne the coalitions of parties and, if they were not deﬁned at the
beginning of the simulation, the parties’ positions on the left/right axis.
The probability of voting for the preferred party is a multiple, k, of the relative
distance on the left-right axis of the main party of the coalition, D/100 (obviously,
if kD/100 > 1 the value is truncated to 1). p = 1 − kD/100 is consequently the
probability of voting for the main party of the coalition.
In each district, the main party of the coalition is the one with the highest share of
votes in the district. In other words, in each district, it is the party which appears
most often as the voters’ ﬁrst preference. As a consequence, the main party in a
coalition may change from district to district.
As with the previous system, the winner in each district is the party with the most
votes in the district.
4.6.5 Runoff Majority
In each district, all the parties minus the 2 who have the most votes are excluded.
A second round is performed with these two only, and the one who has the largest
number of votes wins. If in the ﬁrst round one party has more than 50% of the
votes, it wins without the need for a second round.
4.6.6 Mixed Member I
In this system, part of the parliament is elected with the First Past The Post system,
and the other with the One-district Proportional system. The percentage of seats
elected with the One-District Proportional system is a parameter speciﬁed by the
user when the Mixed Member I system is chosen.
Practically, the program computes a full parliament with the First Past The Post
15system, and another parliament with the One-district Proportional system. The
ﬁnal parliament is a weighted average of these two parliaments, the weights being
determined by the parameter set up by the user.
4.6.7 Mixed Member I - with strategic vote
As the previous one using the First Past the Post system with strategic vote.
4.6.8 Mixed Member II
In this system, part of the parliament is elected with the First Past The Post system,
and the other with the One-district Proportional system. However, the votes used
for the First Past The Post part of the parliament are lost for the One-district Pro-
portional one (this is the difference with the previous system).
In the program, the part of the parliament elected with the First Past The Post sys-
tem is determined by the user. As with the previous system, the program computes
ﬁrst a full parliament with the First Past The Post System, then a parliament with
the One-district Proportional system with the votes not used by the First Past The
Post system. The ﬁnal parliament is, as before, a weighted average of these two
parliaments.
4.6.9 Mixed Member II - with strategic vote
As the previous one using the First Past the Post system with strategic vote.
4.6.10 Borda Criterion
This system uses the voters’ complete preference order for parties. For each voter,
the program gives points to each party, according to its place in the preference
order. Here, the points correspond exactly with the position of the party in the
array of preferences of the voter (that is 0 for the most preferred party, 1 for the
second preferred party, ..., N − 1 for the least preferred party); where N is the
total number of parties. The points obtained by each party are then summed up for
all voters in the population. The winner is the party with the smallest sum.
4.6.11 Condorcet Winner
In each district the Condorcet Winner is chosen. This is the party that beats all the
others when confronted in pairs.
NOTE: in case of cycle, the party with the highest number of votes in the district
wins. The program reports under the graph of the parliament the number of cycles
found during the computation of this system.
164.6.12 VAP System
NOTE: the VAP System is a new electoral system elaborated at the department PO-
LIS of the Universita’ del Piemonte Orientale. For further details, see G. Ortona
“A weighted-voting system that performs quite well”, POLIS Working paper n. 4,
1999 http://polis.unipmn.it/pubbl/index.php?paper=440.
In this system, we consider a ‘real’ parliament (deﬁned in terms of seats) and a
‘virtual’ parliament (deﬁned in terms of votes for the parties in the government).
The real parliament is elected with the One-district Proportional system. The vir-
tual parliament depends on the composition of the government. As a consequence,
the ﬁrst output of this system is identical to that of the One-District Proportional
system.
To obtain the virtual parliament (in terms of votes of the parties in government),
the user must decide which parties compose the government (upper right panel).
When the parties in government reach the majority, the virtual parliament is com-
puted according to the following rule: the votes of the MPs from the bigger parties
in the government are given a weight a > 1. These parties are deﬁned crucial.
The rationale for this weight is to allow the government to keep the majority even
if some small parties leave the governing coalition. Therefore, the smaller parties
lose their blackmail power. The government loses the majority only if big parties
leave the coalition.
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where X is the number of seats in the parliament of the m biggest parties in the
government, and T is the size of the parliament. This way, the government keeps a
majority of y even if small parties leave it.
X and y are parameters. In the program, they have the following values:
• y = 1, that is the government keeps a majority of 1 vote if the small parties
leave
• X = 18% that is a crucial party must have at least 18% of seats in the
parliament, and be part of the government. Note: X can be speciﬁed by the
user when the virtual parliament is created, 18% is only the default value of
the parameter.
Once it is created, the virtual parliament substitutes the real one in the parliament
graph and in the summary table below.
174.6.13 Multi-District Proportionality
Hare method The program:
1. computes the quota (number of votes necessary in order to obtain a seat)
using the following formula: hare quota = number of electors
in the plurinominal district/number of seats per plurinominal
district
2. gives each party as many seats as the number of full quotients (n=number
of votes/quota) obtained
3. substracts from the votes for each party the number of votes used to give the
seats to the party (n*quota): we get the remaining votes for each party
4. checks whether all the seats available for the district have been attributed to
a candidate
• SI’ (yes): the process terminates
• NO: attributes the remaining seats to the parties with the most remain-
ining votes
Imperiali Method Like the Hare method, but using the following formula to ﬁnd
thequota: imperiali quota = number of electors in the plurinominal
district/(number of seats per plurinominal district + 2)
NOTE: when there are few parties (less than 5), or the plurinominal districts are
small (parameter “number of seats per plurinominal district” smaller than 10), the
share in the Imperiali method is very small. As a consequence, the method will
favour small parties, and under-represent large parties.
Sainte-Lag¨ ue Method The program:
1. creates a matrix containing all the parties, their respective votes and the fac-
tors as shown in table 1 (assuming that the number of seats per plurinominal
district is equal to 5):
Factor Sainte Lag¨ ue party A party B party C party D party E
/1 350 310 140 120 80
/3 116 103 46 40 26
/5 70 62 28 24 16
Total sum of seats 2 1 1 1 0
Table 1: Matrix for the Sainte Lag¨ ue method
2. uses as factors a series of odd numbers starting with 1 (that is 1, 3, etc).
3. takes from the matrix the best n results (where n=number of seats per pluri-
nominal district) and gives the parties as many seats as they had best results.
18D’Hondt Method As the Sainte-Lag¨ ue method, but using a series of factors
starting with 1 (that is 1, 2, 3, etc) and ending with n, the number of seats per
plurinominal district.
4.6.14 Single Transferable vote
Withthissystem, theseatsforeachparty, ineachplurinominaldistrict, areassigned
according to a quota value. If some seats are not assigned with this method, the
votes unused by the elected candidates are transferred to the next candidates in
the elector’s preference ordering. The candidates with the highest number of votes
(obtained + transferred) are elected.
The types of quota 3 methods can be used to compute the quota:
N.B. quota : (number of electors in the plurinominal district) divided by (number
of seats per plurinominal district + 1)
Droop quota : [(number of electors in the plurinominal district) divided by (num-
ber of seats per plurinominal districts + 1)]+1
Hare quota : (number of electors in the plurinominal district) divided by (number
of seats per plurinominal district)
Creating the parliament
1. from the elector’s preference ordering with respect to the candidates, the
program sums up the votes obtained by each candidate (we assume that the
elector votes for his preferred candidate).
2. some candidates have a total of votes equal or greater than the quota?
(a) YES
i. the candidates with more votes than the quota are inserted in a list
of elected candidates
ii. these candidates are eliminated from the list of candidates to be
elected for their party
iii. the surplus of votes of the elected candidates is transferred as de-
scribed below.
(b) NO
i. the candidate with the smallest number of votes is eliminated from
the list of available candidates
ii. the voters who had the candidate just eliminated as ﬁrst preference
give their votes to the next candidate in their preference order
This process is repeated until:
19• the requested number of candidates is elected (parameter “number of seats
per plurinominal district”)
• the number of candidates still to be elected is equal to the number of seats
left. In this case, the remaining candidates are elected, even though their
votes are less than the quota.
Criteria for transfering the surplus
• for each elected candidate (number of votes greater than or equal to the
quota), thesurplusiscomputedusingthefollowingformula: surplus=sum
of votes given to the candidate - quota
• the surplus is transferred, starting by the largest, in the following way:
1. from the candidate’s voters, a number of voters equal to the surplus to
share out is extracted at random
2. the votes of these voters are transferred to the candidate indicated as
next preferred in their preference ordering, and not yet elected
3. ifdoingthisweﬁndthatacandidate’svotesbecomesequaltoorgreater
than the quota, this candidate is elected and eliminated from the list of
candidates available to be elected.
4.7 The indexes
NOTE: for the VAP system, these indexes are computed using the virtual parlia-
ment (that is the one in terms of votes).
4.7.1 Representativeness index - 1
The representativeness index of the electoral system j is given by:







• Sj,i= number of seats obtained by the party i with the system j
• Spp,i= number of seats obtained by the party i with the one-district propor-
tional system
Hence the ﬁrst sum is the sum of the seats ‘displaced’ with respect to the propor-
tional system. This number is an indicator of the lack of proportionality.
• Su,i= number of seats that the party has in the case of maximum lack of pro-
portionality, deﬁned as the case in which the largest party in the proportional
system has all the seats, and the other parties have none.
204.7.2 Representativeness index - 2





• X = number of seats in eccess with respect to one-district proportionality
• T = total number of seats in the parliament
This is a “naive” index, easy to understand and therefore useable in surveys. If for
instance there are 100 seats in the parliament and three parties A, B, C with 50, 30
and 20 seats respectively with the one-district proportional system, and 80, 20 and
0 seats respectively with the current system, the index is equal to 0.4 (parties B and
C lost 30 seats overall and party A gained 30).
The two indices of representativeness are highly correlated, but they have a differ-
ent meaning. That of R2 is obvious; R1 has two differences:
a) the seats assigned differently from pure proportionality are counted twice, as
they are unduly gained from one side and unduly lost from the other. If a party
gains 10 seats and another one loses 10, the loss of proportionality (in the nu-
merator) is 20, while in R2 is 10. It is possible to make R1 analogous to R2,
simply dividing the numerator by 2;
b) the standardization (and the value of the denominator) are case-speciﬁc. As a
result, for a given share of seats allocated differently from pure proportional-
ity, the value of r1 increases if the relative decrease of parties that lose seats
decreases. For instance, if under pure proportionality A has 70 seats and B 30,
and under X they are respectively 90 and 10 (hence with 20% of the seats mis-
allocated and a relative decrease of B of 2/3), the value of R1,x is 0.33; while
if the ﬁgures are 60 and 40 under pure proportionality and 80 and 20 under X
(again with 20% of the seats misallocated, but with a relative decrease of B of
50%), the value of R1, x rises to 0.5.
4.7.3 Governability index - 1
This index is made up of two sums:
Gj = A + B (5)
• A = 1/(C + 1) where C is the number of parties in the government such
that if they leave the government, it loses the majority (these parties are said
to be crucial)
• B = n
[(m/2)+1] ∗ [ 1
C − 1
C+1] where
– n=number of seats above the majority level (half the number of seats
plus one if the number of seats is even, half the number of seats plus
0.5 if it is odd)
21– m=total number of seats
– C=total number of crucial parties
Suppose for instance that the majority is made of two parties, both crucial. The A
component of the index states that its value is comprised between 1/3 and 1/2. The
exact value is determined by the component B. If the majority has just half of the
seats plus one, the value of B will be zero, and A + B will be equal to A, i.e. to
1/3. At the opposite, if the majority has all the seats, the value of A + B will be
very close to 1/2 (actually it will tend to 1/2 as the total number of seats increases).






• S = share of seats in the parliament obtained by the parties in the government
• N = number of parties in the government
This is a “naive” index, that simply expresses the direct ratio between governability
and S, and the inverted ratio between governability and N. It is easy to understand
and can therefore be used in surveys.











• S = share of seats in the parliament obtained by the parties in the government
• N = number of parties in the government in the system x
• P = number of parties of the minimal majority in the one-district propor-
tional system that includes all the parties of the majority of the system x
• a = parameter with values between 0 and 1, set up by the user
This index introduce the factions within the parties. Assume that there are 100
seats in the parliament, that the current government (system x) is made up of two
parties with 60 seats, and that in the one-district proportionality these parties would
reach the majority only in alliance with 3 other parties. In this case, S/N is equal
to 0.3 and N/P to 0.4. Now assume a = 0. In this case, S/N is not changed,
which means that the factions have no inﬂuence. If instead a = 1, the index be-
comes S/P (0.12 in the example), which means that the ‘real’ parties are not the
22ones in the government witht the system x but those in the government with the
one-district proportional system. In the system x, those parties become factions of
bigger parties in order to get votes, but still maintain fully their independence. The
weight of the factions increase with a: if for instance a = 0.8, the index is equal to
0.144 instead of 0.3.
For further details on the meaning of the representativeness index - 1 and the
governability index - 1, see Marie-Edith Bissey, Mauro Carini and Guido Or-
tona “ALEX3: a simulation program to compare electoral systems”, Journal of
Artiﬁcial Societies and Social Simulation, vol.7, n.3 (2004), downloadable from
http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/7/3/3.html.
5 EXPANDING THE PROGRAM
5.1 Adding a new electoral system
[To add a new electoral system or otherwise make changes to the program,
you need to have Java Standard Edition installed on your computer, not just
Java Runtime!]
The program is written using the object-programming capabilities of Java, there-
fore any new electoral system has to be extended from a preceeding one. Only the
methods that differ between the two systems have to be written. All the electoral
systemsareextendedfromtheclassParliamentinthepackageparliaments.
Uninominal systems are grouped in the package parliaments.uninominal
and the plurinominal are in the package parliaments.plurinominal. Each
class deﬁning a new system has a name identical to its reference key in the lan-
guage ﬁle (directory languages
uninominal **.properties or languages
plurinominal **.properties). This identity allows the program to load
automatically any new system in the list of the available parliaments. No other
class needs to be altered.
To create a new electoral system:
1. create a new class in the package (and the directory) parliaments
uninominal or parliaments
plurinominal, with a name that represents the system, and is identical
to its reference key in the language ﬁle
2. this new class must at least extend the Parliament class. It is possible to
extend another class of the package to take advantage of its characteristics
(all the existing classes in the program already extend Parliament).
3. the Parliament declares 3 abstract functions, that must be deﬁned for
each new class that extends it:
• public abstract HashMap findAllocationOfSeats();
deﬁnes the way the seats are allocated in the parliament. It is the most
23important class of the electoral system. The two other classes that fol-
low allow to identify the parliament in the various menus and output
ﬁles.
• public abstract String getParliamentName();
deﬁnes the name of the parliament using the language ﬁle and adding to
it the name and/or values of extra parameters (eg. the rounding method
for the VST, or the threshold value of the threshold proportional)
• public abstract String getParliamentKey();
deﬁnes the key with which the parliament is saved in the list of the sim-
ulations(objectSimulationRepositoryoftheVotingObjects
package). This key is used to save the parliament in a ﬁle, or to re-load
it if the display window has been closed. Again in this case it is ad-
visable to include in this string the names and/or values of the extra
parameters of the system.
In addition, it is possible to deﬁne extra parameters (eg. the rounding method
for the plurinominal systems) in the class constructor.
To extract a name from the language ﬁle, the program uses the getString
function from the Language object, which takes as arguments the name of
the ﬁle and the requested key:
language.getString("uninominal","ThresholdProportional");
ThelanguageobjectisaninstanceoftheLanguageclassoftheglobals
package. This is an object of type Singleton (there can be only one instance
of this object in the program). Using this type of object allows to manage the
display language inside the program, and to modify it ‘on the ﬂy’. The name
of the ﬁle to pass as argument is therefore only the part before the extension
.properties.
4. add the name of the class as key string in all the language ﬁles, and the name
of the parliament in the considered language. NOTE: even if you do not
translate the name of the parliament in other languages than your own, it is
recommanded to insert the parliament key in all language ﬁles.
5. compile the program using the make command at the MS/DOS prompt.
The new electoral system will automatically appear in the list of available electoral
systems that is shown once the districts have been created. NOTE: a plurinominal
systemwillonlyappeariftheparameter“numberofseatsperplurinominaldistrict”
is greater than one in the simulation.
5.2 Adding a new index
The steps to follow are similar to those indicated for the electoral systems. The in-
dexes are in the package indexes and all extend the Index class, which declare
24the abstract function computeIndex(), that must be deﬁned for each index.
Once the program has been recompiled using the make command, the new index
will automatically appear in the bottom right list of indexes within the parliament
window. As for the electoral system, the name of the new index class must be the
same as its reference key in the language ﬁles languages
index xx.properties.
5.3 Adding a new language
You can add a new language to the program without recompiling it. It is enough to
create the following 5 ﬁles (and to translate their contents):
• indexes xx.properties contains the reference keys and names of the
indexes that appear in the bottom right part of the parliament window
• uninominal xx.properties contains the reference keys and names
of the uninominal systems
• plurinominal xx.propertiescontainsthereferencekeysandnames
of the plurinominal systems
• labels xx.propertiescontainsthereferencekeysandnames/messages
that appear in the various windows of the program
• messages xx.properties contains the reference keys and text of the
error messages of the program
NOTE 1: In the ﬁle names indicated above the sequence xx must be substituted
by the 2 letters that identify the requested language (for instance it (Italian), fr
(French) en (English)). A list of the languages accepted by Java can be seen
at the following address: http://ftp.ics.uci.edu/pub/ietf/http/
related/iso639.txt.
NOTE 2: Up to now the languages used in the program use the latin alphabet. I do
not know how (and whether) the program would work with a cyrillic or an Asian
alphabet.
NOTE 3: I would be glad if you could send me your translation of the program
(ﬁles *.properties and readme if you did that one too) at the following ad-
dress marieedith.bissey@sp.unipmn.it so I can include them (with all
due reference to the translator) in further versions of the program.
5.4 Creating a ﬁle of preferences
As explained above, the program allows to save a simulation, as well as the pa-
rameters of the simulation. For instance, if the simulation data are saved while one
saves a parliament, it is possible to re-use this ﬁle to re-create a new simulation
with the same parameters. The program simulates automatically the missing data
25(voters’ preferences and district composition).
The directory savedSimulations contains some examples of ﬁles saved from
theprogram(exampleUninominal.outandexamplePlurinominal.out).
These are simple ascii ﬁles, so it is not too complex to create one of them to be
loaded up in the program, in order to introduce preferences and district composi-
tion obtained from surveys.
5.4.1 The least a ﬁle must contain
The least a ﬁle must contain are the following parameters, in a format identical to
the one reported below:
nameRepository : sim_1 // name of the simulation
descriptionRepository :
numberPlurinominalDistricts : 5 :// Number of plurinominal districts
numberUninominalDistricts : 10 :// Number of uninominal districts
probFirst : 0.8 :// first adjacent party
probSecond : 0.1 :// second adjacent party
probPreferred : 0.9 :// preferred candidate
totalNumberVoters : 1000 :// total number of voters
numberParties : 3 :// Number of parties
numberVoters : 100 :// Number of voters per uninominal district
numberCandidates : 2 :// Number of seats per plurinominal district
party_1_name:1 : // party name
party_1_share:25.0 : // share (\%)
party_1_major:false :// major?
party_1_concentration:0: // concentrated in how many districts?
party_1_coefficient:1.0 :// Concentration coefficient
party_2_name:2 : // party name
party_2_share:40.0 : //share (\%)
party_2_major:false :// major?
party_2_concentration:0: // concentrated in how many districts?
party_2_coefficient:1.0 :// Concentration coefficient
party_3_name:3 : // party name
party_3_share:35.0 : //share (\%)
party_3_major:false :// major?
party_3_concentration:0: // concentrated in how many districts?
party_3_coefficient:1.0 :// Concentration coefficient
The strings on the left of the “:” allow to identify the variables to insert in the
program, therefore they must not be altered. The decimal values must have a dot
to separate the decimal part of the number (not a comma). The strings on the right
26of the “:”, preceded by “//” are comments and can be omitted. The indexes used as
the parties name must start from 1 to the number of parties in the system.
With these values, the program is able to simulate the voters’ preferences for the
parties (and for the candidates if requested), to establish the composition of the
districts and to compute the parliaments.
5.4.2 Other contents
A ﬁle saved from the program contains, in addition to the parameters described
above, the voters’ preferences for the parties and the candidates, and the composi-
tion of the uninominal and the plurinominal districts. If one of these elements is
present in the ﬁle in the expected format and is complete, the program will use it.
Otherwise, it will be simulated.
Please look at the example ﬁles to see which format you must use. As for the
previous section, each row must contain 3 elements separated with “:”:
chiave_di_riferimento:valore:commento







In this case, there are 1000 voters in the simulation, and 3 parties (identiﬁed as 1, 2,
3). Foreachvoter, thereferencekeyis: voter_xxx_partyPreferences:[a,b,c]:
where xxx is the index of the voter, in our case from 1 to 1000, the list of parties
is written between square brackets, the indexes of the parties are comma-separated
lists, the most preferred parties is the ﬁrst one written in the list (on the left). Please
note that even if there are no comments, the second “:” must appear anyway.
Voters’ preferences for candidates A candidate is identiﬁed by its party, and its
position in the party’s list of candidates. For instance, if there are 3 parties and
2 seats per plurinominal district, a party list will contain 2 candidates, and there
will therefore be a total of 6 candidates in the simulation. In this case, the list of
candidates will be as follows:
candidate1_1:1_1:// candidate in first position in the list of party 1
candidate1_2:1_2:// candidate in second position in the list of party 1
candidate2_1:2_1:// candidate in first position in the list of party 2
candidate2_2:2_2:// candidate in second position in the list of party 2
candidate3_1:3_1:// candidate in first position in the list of party 3
candidate3_2:3_2:// candidate in second position in the list of party 3
27Voters’ preferences for the candidates are written as follows:
voter_1000_candidatePreferences:[3_1, 3_2, 2_1, 2_2, 1_1, 1_2]:
voter_999_candidatePreferences:[3_2, 3_1, 2_1, 2_2, 1_1, 1_2]:
voter_998_candidatePreferences:[3_1, 3_2, 2_1, 1_1, 2_2, 1_2]:
voter_997_candidatePreferences:[3_1, 3_2, 1_1, 2_2, 2_1, 1_2]:
voter_996_candidatePreferences:[3_2, 2_1, 3_1, 2_2, 1_1, 1_2]:
where in the list of candidates, the number before the _ is the index of the party,
and the number after the _ is the position of the candidate in the list.
Compositionofuninominaldistricts Uninominaldistrictsareessentiallygroups
of voters. The size of the districts is deﬁned by the numberVoters parameter
and is the same for all the uninominal districts in the simulation. In the ﬁle, the
composition of a plurinominal district is written as follows
districtUninominal_1_nameOfDistrict : 1 :// Name of the uninominal district
districtUninominal_1_concentratedMajorParty : false :// does it contain a concentrated party?
districtUninominal_1_nameMajorParty : 0 : // name of the major party (if there is one)
districtUninominal_1_listOfVoters :[956 , 154 , 550 , 76 , 935 , 113 , 407 , 507 , 818 , 530 , 41 , 600 ,(...), 759 , 640 ]
The ﬁrst 3 rows describe the district: its ‘name’ (or index), whether it con-
tains a concentrated party, and in this case, the party index. If it does not contain
a concentrated party, as is the case above, the party index is 0. The fourth row
contains the voters that belong to the district, identiﬁed by their index. In the ex-
ample, the district contains the voters 956, 154, etc. The list of voters must contain
numberVoters elements.
Composition of plurinominal districts Plurinominal districts are made of uni-
nominal districts.
districtPlurinominal_1_name : 1 :// Name of the plurinominal district (roman= I)
districtPlurinominal_1_listOfDistricts : [2, 4]
The ﬁrst row deﬁnes the name of the plurinominal district (as before, an index).
In the results ﬁles, this plurinominal district will appear with a name written in ro-
man number, to distinguish it from the uninominal districts. The list of uninominal
districts contained in the plurinominal district contains numberCandidate ele-
ments, the uninominal districts are identiﬁed by their index.
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